Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 32

Issue 3

Article 9

7-1-2015

J. L. Schellenberg, EVOLUTIONARY RELIGION
Veronika Weidner

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Weidner, Veronika (2015) "J. L. Schellenberg, EVOLUTIONARY RELIGION," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 32 : Iss. 3 , Article 9.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201532348
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol32/iss3/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

Faith and Philosophy

350

treatment of Socrates as a new kind of hero to which Achilles and Odysseus
serve as foils is beautifully executed and rewarding to read. Similarly, his
exploration of the polyvalent significance of Crito arriving to find Socrates
asleep is meritorious. The book’s fecundity, however, frequently is like an
overflowing cornucopia; too often missing is a measured, deliberative,
and dare I say scholarly enjoyment of the bounty. Another excellence consists in the book’s occasional references to contemporary circumstances:
“Socrates’s feat is of no little significance in our own day” (219). Ranasinghe is certainly correct. Yet here, he takes regrettable recourse in glib
labels and drive-by diagnoses—“postmodern man,” the “deified market,”
“religious anti-humanism,” and “atheistic science” are cavalierly bandied
about where critical precision, sobriety of judgment, and provocative argument are necessary.
The book’s rhetorical qualities matter less than its methodology and
substance, yet I must add a few comments about style. Socrates and the
Gods would have benefited from a strong editorial hand. Clearer initial
statements of argument and periodic rehearsals of arguments are needed.
Simple divisions and subheadings within the chapters are lacking. Truncation of undisciplined prose would help. Perhaps most all, much refinement
is needed of the untold allusions found in the book. Classical allusions
to Homer, fifth-century tragedians, and philosophical texts are fine and
useful. Shakespearean turns of phrase are occasionally decorous, if selfindulgent. But Abraham Lincoln (“fool some of the people all of the time”),
Dale Carnegie (“win friends and influence people”), and John Gillespie
Magee (“escape the surly bonds of earth”)? The book’s anachronistic allusions quickly become wearyingly trite. More bothersome are periodic
Christian allusions which too conveniently assimilate Socrates to Christ.
Plainly, Socrates and the Gods is too autochthonous to displace standard
scholarly treatments of the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. Yet because
Ranasinghe idiosyncratically neglects the scholarly literature, he has a free
hand to develop a novel, perceptive, and striking interpretation. Thus is it
that, despite real limits, Socrates and the Gods can offer great gifts to dialectically engaged readers.

Evolutionary Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013. 174 pages. $29.95 (paperback).
VERONIKA WEIDNER, University of Munich
Either some form of traditional religion or no religion at all—these seem to
be the only two alternatives on offer today. But maybe this impression is
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rather deceptive. John L. Schellenberg argues that there is already a third
option in sight. It could save religion without reducing it to one of its classical concepts such as, for example, Buddhism or Christianity. Starting with
reflections on the discovery of deep time by natural science, Schellenberg
asks if there might be a new brand of religion which is appropriate to
our current place on the evolutionary timeline. And indeed, there is one
which he proposes—it is, as the title already suggests, “evolutionary religion.” According to Schellenberg, this form of religion would suit us
best at present. Providing reasons backing up that claim and defending
it against possible objections is what his new book is about. Addressed to
a wide audience, he makes it an easy read, first, by leaving out notes and
comments until the end; and second, by summarizing comprehensibly
the main thoughts of his trilogy (Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion;
The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism; and The Will
to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion [Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2005, 2007, 2009]) whose threads converge and are tied up now in
an evolutionary framework.
So how is the book structured? Basically, it consists of four pairs of
chapters which are framed by a prologue and epilogue. The first two
chapters deal with the scientific exploration of the evolution of life, which
shows that we have a deep past and suggests we are likely to have a deep
future, too. The next couple of chapters address what epistemological
consequences a philosopher of religion should draw out of this. Namely,
it is “‘evolutionary skepticism’” (36) or, applied to religious matters, “evolutionary religious skepticism” (56), which again allows a glance at new
forms of religion. How one of them, evolutionary religion, might look in
theory as well as in practice is examined in the third pair of chapters. The
last two chapters contain a negative and a positive defense of evolutionary
religion; potential objections are rebutted and further support is given for
his main claim.
Let’s take a slightly closer look now and highlight some of his thoughts.
Surprisingly, to begin with, Schellenberg states that it could be science
which paves the way for helping its much criticized antipode, religion,
to revive and even to become friends. But how is that thinkable? What
we owe great pioneers in geology, biology and also physics is, as already
mentioned, the insight that our species has a deep time, i.e., a deep past
and a deep future. Regarding the former, most of us have internalized the
assumptions of evolutionary theory—that life on earth started developing
about 3.5 billion years ago, that the hominid species which diverged from
the apes’ lineage is probably 200,000 years old, that human intellect entered into the picture in the last 50,000 years, and that organized religion
has existed for approximately 6,000 years. Regarding the latter, according to Schellenberg, only a few of us are aware of the deep future that
lies ahead of us, which could last another 1 billion years, the first 600,000
years of which humankind is expected to subsist. Taking on that scientific
perspective allows us to see that our species is just at the beginning of
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its intellectual development, concerning both its biological and cultural
evolution, i.e., how it is designed by natural processes and how it designs
itself through cultural processes. “Suppose we take an individual human
life of eighty years to represent the 800,000 years our species may last. We
would then have to be regarded as being something like a twenty-year-old
who only started thinking about religion some six months ago” (4). Thus,
there is a “Great Disparity” (18) between our short past lying behind us
and a comparatively long future opening up ahead of us. Well then, what
may be next? Imagination is needed, Schellenberg says. At any rate, the
initial point of figuring this out is “‘temporalism” (6), a position which
emphasizes our place in time and tries to include it in thinking about religion, too.
The implications of such a temporalist thinking, however, are more
radical than one would expect, also in terms of epistemology, for it leads
to a certain kind of skepticism. More specifically, it is, as noted above, evolutionary skepticism and evolutionary religious skepticism which follow
from it. Why is that? In general, even though there are some beliefs which
are not vulnerable because there is evidence enough to justify them (e.g.,
about natural selection or deep time), there is a whole bunch of rather
tenuous beliefs, too. This in turn is the case either because of only limited
evidence accessible to us or because these beliefs possess certain properties (such as being “precise,” “detailed,” “profound,” “attractive,” “ambitious,”
or “controversial,” 49–50) in combination and to a high degree respectively.
In these cases, doubting a claim is preferable to believing or disbelieving it
to be true or false. And in particular, many traditional religious as well as
irreligious beliefs turn out to be inappropriate to our stage of intellectual
development. This is mainly due to the aforementioned properties they
exhibit (the properties argument) or due to our still limited intellectual
capacities to detect further evidences (“the ‘capacities’ argument,” 66).
Hence, right now, Schellenberg argues, we should declare neither a religious nor an irreligious claim to be either true or false.
That’s the reason for a “new pessimism” (56; see also The Wisdom to
Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism, 2007)—in contrast to even
embracing the “old pessimism” (56) of many atheists who worry about
traditional religious beliefs but keep holding on to their irreligious beliefs—so that, on the one hand, evolutionary (religious) skepticism will
“be deepened” (36). But this skepticism will also be “lightened” (36), since
it does not mark the end of religion but rather the beginning of a new
form of it which arises at the horizon, namely “evolutionary religion.”
By that term Schellenberg does not refer to a newly founded religion or
a particular religious form of life for which he is seeking converts, but
rather to an “object of inquiry” (6) in which he invites others to engage, viz.
“a form of religion appropriate to or befitting intelligence at a first stage
of evolutionary development: religion for primitives who hope to evolve
into something more” (73).
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And that this form of religion comes into view is reason enough for a
“new optimism” (72; see also The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion, 2009). Which theoretical features would it display? There
are four conditions necessary for calling a religion an evolutionary one:
“religious diachronism” (enhancing temporalism), “religious skepticism”
(replacing beliefs with non-believing faith which in turn is compatible
with skepticism), “religious developmentalism” (looking forward to the
future and being aware of the small evolutionary steps), and “religious
pragmatism” (paying attention to its positive benefits for culture; 75).
Schellenberg claims that the second one is able to solve the classical problem of faith and reason because faith is no longer based on easily criticizable beliefs.
So much for the theory. But how is evolutionary religion to be conceived
in practice? Its unique distinction would be the aforementioned form of
nonbelieving faith, more exactly faith-that and faith-in. Concerning the
former (defined as “propositional faith” in Prolegomena to a Philosophy of
Religion, 2005), first, its object is the transcendent, whose central content
again is defined as a “triple transcendence” (94), i.e., a “metaphysical,” “axiological,” and “soteriological” transcendent reality, or a reality distinct
from and beyond nature that is of outstanding intrinsic value and in relation to which a good can be achieved. As to the “degree of content” (94), the
concept of the Divine is conceived to be “thin” (95, 97) in evolutionary
religion, i.e., without including any additional details as to the nature of
this threefold transcendence. Regarding the “depth of content” (cf. 95), the
concept of the Divine will be a “strong” (96–97) one, i.e., thinking of the
Divine as ultimate in all three spheres of transcendence (“triple ultimacy”
96). Schellenberg names the claim that such a triply-ultimate being exists
“ultimism” (99). Second, its attitude excludes belief and exceeds acceptance
but includes a “pro-attitude” (103) with respect to ultimism, thinking of
it as epistemically possible, picturing the world as entailing its truth, intending to reason in accordance with it and to actually start going in this
direction. Concerning the latter (called “operational faith” in Prolegomena
to a Philosophy of Religion, 2005), its practical consequences for behavior
comprise three dimensions: “downward,” “inward,” and “outward” (107),
i.e., aiming at understanding religious issues more deeply, transforming
one’s dispositions of feelings such as anxiety into serenity, and being willing to take a risk thereby.
Finally, what possible criticisms his suggestions might face and how
they could be answered is considered by Schellenberg, too. The problem
of evil does not pose a threat to evolutionary religion, nor is an afterlife
epistemologically impossible on his account. Moreover, non-believing
faith cannot be considered something like wishful thinking, nor is it to
be confused with the one adherents of some “new age” religion have.
Plus, it is not likely that his proposal will be a complete non-starter, given
the growing number of skeptics worldwide. Additionally, Schellenberg
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defends his view by supplying other reasons to agree with his claim that
the new form of religion put forward by him is one which fits us best at
present. The old, well-known arguments for God´s existence, which he
thinks fail to justify theistic belief, are nevertheless worthy of a second
glance, since the aims that drove their proponents are pretty much attractive, particularly these days (at first elaborated in The Will to Imagine:
A Justification of Skeptical Religion, 2009; only Pascal’s Wager and Kant’s
Postulate were left out here). As it turns out, these goals could best be
achieved within the framework of evolutionary religion. Thus, this
form of religion is the one we should consider to be appropriate for us
now. Anselm’s ontological argument builds on “The Enlargement Aim”
(141)—that we humans should try to reach and slightly shift the limits
of our thinking capacities. Leibniz’s cosmological argument reveals his
ambition to seek the best understanding of the way things are, i.e., he
is motivated by “The Aim of Understanding” (144). Paley’s teleological
argument exposes his amazement at the beauty of the world so that he
may be said to emphasize “The Aim of Respect for Beauty.” And James’s
pragmatic argument and reasoning can be read as displaying three aims:
“The Zestful Productivity Aim” (151); “The Aim to Reconcile Competing Duties” (152); and “The Aim of Respect for What Ought To Be True”
(153)—i.e., to seek productivity enthusiastically in this life, which religion
encourages us to do; to avoid living as though religious claims were not
true by assuming that they are true and only thereby being able to find
more evidence; and to live according to what ought to be true (even if it
might turn out not to be true) as long as at present there is no compelling
evidence indicating otherwise.
Schellenberg sets out to introduce a new alternative to the various religious traditions on the one hand and naturalism on the other hand by
reconciling religion and evolutionary science—and what comes out is
evolutionary religion. His main aim is to stimulate people to simply start
thinking about it (6), and to give that a try seems definitely worthwhile.
“Perhaps religion has had a bad start in the world. . . . Maybe religion
needs to be born again” (90). Fresh, provoking and inspiring ideas are
presented to the reader, who is led to walk with him on a Frostian road
less travelled by. Hence, to someone who is curious about broadening her
horizon to a slightly unconventional perspective, this book is highly recommended. Of course, some will argue that Schellenberg’s proposal goes
too far. It might be the case that he would see such criticism even as a compliment, since there seems to be no “far enough.” Anyway, his new book
is a great invitation to look not backward but forward, and to consider the
view that religion may evolve, too.1

1
I thank Leigh Vicens and Charles Taliaferro for their very helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this review concerning both its linguistic correctness and its content.

